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When faced with the choice between preserving the English monarchy and
protecting his client's interests, Lord Henry Brougham famously set forth the duty
of zealous advocacy in stating:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may
bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be
his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.'
To a criminal defense attorney, there is something inherently reassuring, if not
inspiring, about Lord Brougham's ethic of advocacy. It portrays the criminal
defense attorney as the final, and perhaps only, bulwark between the client and the
rest of the world. To Brougham, an advocate must disregard all others, as well as
his own interests, in defense of his client. The advantage of such a conception,
with its emphasis on unwavering fealty, is that any ethical dilemma can be reduced
to a simple inquiry test: does the lawyer's decision serve his client's interests?
This ethic of advocacy is particularly useful for the criminal defense attorney.
Ideally, the criminal defense attorney conducts his work in an adversarial system
where the stakes could not be higher. While it is true that the criminal case, like
any civil matter, can resolve in settlement, the bargaining chip ultimately involves
the client's liberty interest. In such a world, accepting the maxim that the
advocate's sole responsibility is to protect and further the client's interests is not
only critical, but indispensable to effective advocacy. Brougham's exhortation of
heedlessness, the disregard of others, ultimately lies at the root of the criminal
attorney's dilemma and goes to the very heart of the current hypothetical. The
issue raised in both instances is the question of how much disregard of others is too
much, and how much disregard of the attorney's own ethics is required.
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The counter-argument to Brougham's ethic of zealous advocacy, often
embraced by prosecutors, is the contention that a criminal defense attorney's
responsibilities do not only extend to the client. Rather, the attorney has
responsibilities to the integrity of the legal system, as well as to greater societal
interests. By disregarding all else in favor of a client's interests, the advocate
ignores these greater, purportedly more noble, obligations.
This perspective is without merit. First, because criminal cases purportedly
occur within the parameters of an adversarial system, the defense attorney best
serves the greater public interest when he zealously safeguards the interests of his
client. Justice Powell said it best in noting that "a defense lawyer best serves the
public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by
advancing 'the undivided interests of his client.' 2
Furthermore, the notion that a defense attorney needs to protect the integrity
of our legal system incorrectly presumes that our system is fair and just and thus
worthy of protection. If such a proposition were true, the current hypothetical
would not exist and our confidence in the outcome of our judicial proceedings
would never waiver. The reason that the current hypothetical is relevant, at least in
the federal system, is that its ethical problems are not only real, but unremarkable.
Indeed, the hypothetical accurately reflects a world where harsh mandatory
minimum sentences apply to the majority of drug cases. Because of that fact, law
enforcement agents manipulate narcotic transactions, often through multiple drug
buys, in order to reach drug quantities that trigger mandatory sentences.
More importantly, in a legal system where mandatory minimum penalties
determine the sentences, the traditional sentencing discretion of the neutral and
unbiased magistrate is replaced by the judgment of the prosecutor who effectively
decides the defendant's sentence by choosing how to charge the case. In effect,
we have arrived at the absurd reality where the Queen of Heart's nonsensical
statement "[s]entence first-verdict afterwards" is realized.4
For the criminal defendant confronting the minimum mandatory sentence,
cooperation (snitching against others) is his only means of avoiding the harsh
penalty. In such a dark wood,6 the incentive to embellish, exaggerate or simply lie
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about the purported criminal activities of others, as portrayed in the hypothetical
case, is powerful, if not overwhelming.7 This fact indicates the most insidious
aspect of the federal system in its betrayal of the Sixth Amendment right to trial.
By effectively compelling cooperation through substantial rewards, the regime
ensures that most federal cases are not resolved through the crucible of trial.
Having said all that, the hypothetical, whether reflective of an unjust system
or not, still demands an answer. Applying Brougham's ethic of advocacy to the
questions presented underscores both its utility and limitations as a guidepost for
the criminal defense practitioner. The answer to the first question of whether
counsel should inform his client regarding the government's interest in a particular
individual seems obvious.
Although the system may unfairly reward the cooperator, it is the world we
live in. Zealously advancing the interests of the client requires the advocate to
provide all relevant information to her so that she can make informed decisions
about her case. The attorney's own suspicion that the client may provide false
testimony does not relieve the advocate from this duty of disclosure. Interjecting
his own concerns regarding unrealized future occurrences into the mix, with its
paternalistic underpinnings, contradicts Brougham's admonition that the advocate
must place his client's interests before all else.
The second question, concerning the advocate's duty when he knows his
client has provided false testimony and will continue to provide false testimony, is
a thornier problem.
A literal reading of Brougham's statement regarding an advocate's duty
suggests that the lawyer do nothing since he has the overriding obligation to
advance his client's interests. To quote a famous legal scholar, however "a
[lawyer's] got to know his limitations." 8 Brougham's ethic of zealous advocacy
does not require the lawyer to utilize all means in defense of his client, regardless
of their legality. Rather, Brougham's duty mandates that the advocate use all
lawful means at his disposal.9
Remaining silent while one's client falsely incriminates another individual is
not simply inaction on the attorney's part. Rather, the advocate's mere presence
places an imprimatur of legitimacy on his client's testimony whether in the
courtroom or in a room full of agents. And though the criminal defense attorney
6 See DANTE ALIGIMER1, LA DIVINA COMMEDIA, INFERNO, CANTO 1 (1472) ("Midway upon
the journey of our life I found myself within a forest dark, for the straightforward pathway had been
lost.").
7 The only remarkable aspect of the hypothetical is that the client does not possess enough
sense to remain silent about her dishonesty. Most cooperating defendants are shrewd enough to
avoid such disclosure to their attorneys.
s Harry Callahan, MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Brothers 1973).
9 See Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1319,
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must ply his trade in a world which provides such tainted rewards, he should not
be forced to contribute to its worst abuses.
The rules of professional conduct may not only compel the attorney to
withdraw from his representation of the client, but may also require him to disclose
the malfeasance to the relevant tribunal.' 0 And therein lies the rub. The system
that so handsomely rewards the snitch encourages the advocate to become one
himself-a truly Machiavellian usurpation of Brougham's ethic.
Such a perversion of Brougham's duty of advocacy reveals its essential
limitation. The ethic is meant to apply to the advocate who operates in a truly
adversarial system. In such a world, the zealous advocacy of the defendant's cause
is critical to the pursuit of justice through the protection, if not vindication, of
individual rights. But, when the landscape is changed in a committed effort to
eliminate adversariness, as it is in the current federal regime, Brougham's duty
loses both its force and effect. Against such a backdrop, the advocate becomes
nothing more than the lowly fishmonger, hoping to sell his dismal product (i.e., his
client's cooperation) before its stench becomes overwhelming.
10 See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
133, 142-48 (2008).
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